
John F Kennedy
John F Kennedy visited
Vietnam in 1951 as a young Congressman and
returned convinced that “to act apart from and in defiance of innately
nationalistic aims spells foredoomed failure.” By 1956, he had stopped speaking
about Vietnamese nationalism, and had assumed the cold war rhetoric, describing
Vietnam as “proving ground for democracy --- a test of American responsibility
and determination.” Of course, South Vietnam wasn’t any more democratic than
North Vietnam.
The beginning of Kennedy’s
term as president, 1961, was another opportunity to get out of Vietnam. There
were only a few American military advisors there. We had given Diem’s
government a lot of economic aid, but we had not committed ground troops or air
support for his war against the Vietcong insurgents.
Diem, for his part, was
holding onto power by a thread. The handpicked followers he had put into leadership
positions in the provinces had no respect. His repression of dissidents by
detaining them in reeducation camps caused even more dissent. His favoritism
toward the Catholic minority alienated the Buddhist majority. His land reform
program, which moved families off their ancestral land and favored rich land
owners, alienated the peasants. In May of 1960, a group of prominent Vietnamese
citizens including 10 cabinet members produced a document, “The Manifesto of
the Eighteen,” demanding reforms and Diem’s resignation, and six months later he
barely survived a second coup.
Kennedy however was
committed. Withdrawal from Vietnam wasn’t even considered. Ten days after
taking office he approved a counterinsurgency plan requiring more military advisors,
and he made articles on guerrilla warfare assigned reading for military
officers.
In May of 1961 Kennedy sent
his vice president, Lyndon Johnson, to Southeast Asia to assess the situation
in Vietnam and neighboring countries. On his return, Johnson echoed the cold
war rhetoric that it was America’s responsibility to defend the “freedom” of
Asian countries, but straddled the fence, saying our decisions should be made “in
full realization of the very heavy and continuing costs in terms of money, of
effort and of US prestige.” He added that if other efforts failed we might have
to cut our losses, and decide against sending US troops.
In the meantime, the Vietcong
were gaining ground in the countryside, isolating Diem’s troops along the
border and in the cities. In October, Diem requested a defense treaty with the
possibility of US troops, so Kennedy sent a team of
advisors, including Gen. Maxwell Taylor, commander of the 101st
Airborne division during WWII, and Walt Rostow, assistant director of the
National Security Council, to Vietnam. They concluded that the South Vietnamese
army was ineffective, but recommended sending in US troops and bombing Hanoi,
to show the South Vietnamese “how the job might be done.”
When Kennedy expressed
reluctance to make a military commitment, the response by Secretary of Defense,
Robert McNamara, and Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, was ambivalent. In a joint
statement they warned that “United States forces could not accomplish their
mission in the midst of an apathetic or hostile population,” while on the other
hand the fall of South Vietnam would “undermine the credibility of American
commitments elsewhere.”
When Diem, pressured by
increasing gains by the Viet Cong or VC, accused the US of getting ready to
pull back, Kennedy committed himself by pledging to “help the Republic of
Vietnam to protect its people and preserve its independence.” Then without any
definite plan, mission, or Congressional approval, he sent in more troops, with
air and naval support, and began “Operation Ranchhand,” the use of defoliatiants
such as Agent Orange, to deprive the VC of jungle cover and food. Of course it
also deprived the Vietnamese civilians of food, so that Vietnam, once a major
exporter of rice, became dependent on US imports. By the end of 1962 there were
11000 US troops in Vietnam. The US death toll was 109 in 1962 and 489 in 1963.
The US strategy had changed
from the threat of massive retaliation under Eisenhower, to limited war during
Kennedy’s administration. Accused of waging an undeclared war, Kennedy
described our involvement as a “training mission.”
At first, the increase in US
involvement had some positive results. VC defections increased, and the ratio
of VC to ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) deaths increased to 5 to 3.
Secretary McNamara declared that we were winning the war, and he predicted that
we would begin to withdraw our troops in 1965. The respite was brief though.
John Kenneth Galbraith,
ambassador to India, visited South Vietnam in 1961 and submitted a formal
report stating that we were “married to failure.” He said the morale of the Vietnamese
army was low; the government was corrupt, and Diem was unwilling to make
reforms. He said that the problem was
internal, and recommended that we negotiate with Hanoi to withdraw our troops
in exchange for them pulling back the Viet Cong. Mike Mansfield, majority
leader in the senate, also visited Vietnam and recommended to President Kennedy
that we pull out. Even Robert Kennedy remarked that no government could stop
the communists in Vietnam. President Kennedy’s response was that he couldn’t pull our troops out until after the 1964 election.
In May of 1963 Diem
prohibited celebration of Buddha’s birthday, destroying what little following
he had in a country that was 80% Buddhist. There followed demonstrations to
which Diem responded by arresting and killing demonstrators. When a Buddhist
monk lit himself on fire in the middle of a busy Saigon intersection, the
American public was horrified.
Kennedy’s handling of the
Cuban missile crisis increased his prestige, and this would have given him
another opportunity to withdraw from Vietnam, but our support was established
policy, so instead of withdrawing or negotiating with Hanoi, we decided on
regime change. Our ambassador to Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge, began meeting with
the top Vietnamese generals to arrange a final coup to remove Diem and his
brother Nhu from power. A month later Diem and Nhu were both dead, and the next month
Kennedy was assassinated.
After thought:
In reading different accounts
of this period, I’ve noticed that historians disagree in their assessment of Ngo
Dinh Diem’s effectiveness as South Vietnam’s president. Most of the accounts judge
him as ineffective, out of touch, and only interested in holding onto power,
but just yesterday I ran across a historian from Hillsdale College named Mark
Moyar. He points out that in the context of Vietnamese culture, Diem’s actions
made sense. Ho Chi Minh, reportedly said of Diem’s assassination:
"I can scarcely
believe the Americans would be so stupid".
He also quotes the North
Vietnamese Politburo:
“The consequences of the 1
November coup d’etat will be contrary to the calculations of the imperialists…
Diem was one of the strongest individuals resisting the people and Communism.
Everything that could be done in an attempt to crush the revolution was carried
out by Diem. Diem was one of the most competent lackeys of the imperialists …Among
the anti-Communists in South Vietnam or exiled in other countries, no one has
sufficient political assets and abilities to cause others to obey. Therefore,
the lackey administration cannot be stabilized. The coup d’etat on 1 November 1963
will not be the last.”
I don’t necessarily agree
with his assessment, but it just illustrates my cousin Steve’s principle of
ambivalence. The more you know about a situation, the less sure you can be
about your judgements. (See my blog post – Ambivalence.
While you can question Diem’s
effectiveness as a leader, I don’t think there’s any question that he didn’t
earn his oxygen, referring to Steve’s other principle. (See my blog post – Earning
Your Oxygen.) No one can cause as much suffering and death as Diem and earn
any oxygen.